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PARTIES TO THIS APPEAL 
The parties to the proceeding before the Utah Solid and 
Hazardous Waste Control Board, which is the subject of this 
appeal were: 
Petitioners 
Sierra Club 
Chemical Weapons Working Group, Inc. 
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation 
Respondents 
Executive Secretary, Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control 
Board ("Executive Secretary") 
United States Department of the Army ("Army") 
EG&G Defense Materials, Inc. ("EG&G") 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction to hear this Petition for Review 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-16(l) and 78-21-3 (2) (a) . 
The Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board (the "Board"), 
acting in its capacity as a state agency, issued an Order on 
July 22, 1997 which is the subject of this Petition for Review. 
That decision denied the First and Second Requests for Agency 
Action filed by Petitioners/Appellants the Sierra Club, Chemical 
Weapons Working Group, Inc. and Vietnam Veterans of America 
Foundation (collectively the "Sierra Club") to challenge the 
permitting decisions of the Executive Secretary of the Utah Solid 
and Hazardous Waste Control Board, Utah Department of 
Environmental Quality (the "Executive Secretary") pursuant to 
authority under the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Act. The 
Board's decision constitutes a final order resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings held on March 18-20, 1997, and April 17, 
1997. The Sierra Club filed a timely petition for review. 
ISSUES ADDRESSED 
1. Whether the Board's decision to uphold the Executive 
Secretary's approval of commencement of trial burns with chemical 
agent at the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility ("TOCDF") 
was supported by substantial evidence where the health risk 
assessment and expert testimony showed no risks above levels of 
concern and TOCDF engineering controls and operational procedures 
have worked as intended. 
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2. Whether the Board's decision not to revoke the Army's 
permit to operate TOCDF was supported by substantial evidence 
where no operational events have resulted in harm to persons or 
the environment and appropriate corrective action has been taken. 
3. Whether the Board's decision not to revoke the decision 
of the Executive Secretary to approve EG&G's application to be 
added to the TOCDF permit was supported by substantial evidence, 
within his discretion and otherwise consistent with applicable 
legal requirements .i7 
4. Whether the Board afforded the Sierra Club procedural 
due process when it provided a formal three-day hearing 
containing all elements essential to a trial and, based upon 
presentations by the parties several months before the hearing, 
placed time limits on all parties' oral presentation of evidence. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
As to Issues 1, 2 and 3 above, this Court should uphold the 
Board's decision unless, on the basis of the record before the 
Board, the Sierra Club has been substantially prejudiced by 
agency action not supported by "substantial evidence" when viewed 
in light of the whole record. Utah Code § 63-46b-16 (4) (g) . 
"Substantial evidence" is such relevant evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Grace 
-
f
 Argument in response to this issue, which was raised by the 
Sierra Club's First Request for Agency Action filed only against 
EG&G, is presented in Section III below solely by EG&G. 
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Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). Although more than a "scintilla" of evidence, substantial 
evidence is something less than the weight of the evidence. I_d. 
In undertaking review, this Court does not substitute its 
judgment for that of the Board. Xd- This Court should not 
disturb the inferences drawn by the Board to support its 
conclusions or the Board's application of its factual findings to 
the law unless the Board's determinations exceed the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality. Id.; Nelson v. Dep't of Emp. 
Sec., 801 P.2d 158, 161 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).z/ In order to 
prevail, the Sierra Club must marshal all of the evidence in the 
record supporting the Board's findings and show that, despite the 
supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or 
contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence. Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d. at 68. 
*
A
 While substantial evidence appears to be the general 
standard of review applicable under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
16(4)(g), the Utah Supreme Court has recently articulated a more 
flexible approach in cases involving an agency's application of 
the law to the facts: ,fA trial court's or agency's application 
of the law to the facts may, depending on the issue, be reviewed 
by an appellate court 'with varying degrees of strictness, 
falling anywhere between a review for "correctness" and a broad 
"abuse of discretion" standard.1" Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 
317 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 6 (May 13, 1997) (quoting Langeland v. 
Monarch Motors, Inc., P.2d (Utah 1996) (307 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 3, December 31, 1996). In that regard, appellate courts may 
take "into account factors such as policy concerns and an 
agency's expertise rather than using undefinable labels such as 
'reasonableness.'" Xd. at 7 n.6. 
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As to Issue 4 above, this Court should affirm the Board's 
decision unless the Sierra Club has been substantially prejudiced 
by agency action that is unconstitutional on its face or as 
applied. Utah Code § 63-46b-16(4)(a). This issue is to be 
reviewed under a "correction-of-error" standard without deference 
given to the Board's decision. Lopez v. Career Serv. Review Bd., 
834 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (holding that issue of 
whether administrative agency afforded petitioner due process in 
hearing was question of law, giving no deference to agency), 
cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992); see also Union Pac. R.R. 
Co. v. State Tax Comm'n. 842 P.2d 876, 881 (Utah 1992); Ouestar 
Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 817 P.2d 316, 317 (Utah 
1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves the Army's destruction of chemical 
warfare agents at an incineration facility near Tooele, Utah. 
The Army is undertaking this program under a mandate from 
Congress to "carry out the destruction of the United States' 
stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions that exist[ed] 
on November 8, 1985." 50 U.S.C. § 1521(a). 
In 1989, the Executive Secretary approved, pursuant to the 
Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Act, the Army's hazardous waste 
plan for construction and operation of a hazardous waste 
treatment facility to destroy the stockpile of chemical weapons 
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located at the Tooele Army Depot. This hazardous waste plan is 
known as the TOCDF permit. 
Following completion of construction and testing of the 
facility with non-agent chemicals, the Army applied to the 
Executive Secretary for approval of trial burn plans to burn 
chemical agents on an interim basis to determine operational 
readiness. In June 1996, the Executive Secretary approved trial 
burn plans for three of TOCDF1s five incinerators. These 
approvals constitute permit modifications. In June 1996, the 
Executive Secretary also modified the TOCDF permit to add the 
Army's contractor, EG&G, as a co-permitee. The Sierra Club 
challenged these decisions through two requests for agency 
action. In its pre-hearing brief, the Sierra Club also indicate 
that it was requesting that the Board revoke the TOCDF permit. 
The Board heard the Sierra Club's challenges during a three 
day evidentiary hearing held March 18-20, 1997 and heard closing 
arguments April 17, 1997. It denied both requests by a vote of 
to 1. This petition for review followed. 
B. The Proceedings Below. 
First Request for Agency Action. On July 18, 1996, the 
Sierra Club submitted its First Request for Agency Action, in 
which it contended that EG&G failed to timely apply for and 
receive permits to construct and operate TOCDF. IR-1. 
Second Request for Agency Action. On July 27, 1996, the 
Sierra Club filed its Second Request for Agency Action, which 
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sought to set aside approvals by the Executive Secretary that 
allowed the Army to commence TOCDF agent trial burns. IR-2 at 
28. In this second request, the Sierra Club alleged that TOCDF 
operations pose an imminent and substantial endangerment to 
public health and the environment, could not achieve required 
destruction and removal efficiencies, could not minimize 
releases, and did not meet emergency preparedness requirements. 
Id. at 13-28. 
Motions for Stay. On August 20, 1996, the Sierra Club filed 
its first motion for stay of TOCDF operations. IR-5. Following 
a hearing on August 22, 1996, the Board denied the motion. 
IR-12. The Sierra Club filed a second motion for stay on 
October 18, 1997. IR-21. Following a half-day evidentiary 
hearing on December 12, 1996, the Board ruled that the Sierra 
Club failed to carry its burden to justify a stay. IR-72, 74. 
Hearing on the Merits. The Sierra Club's first and second 
requests for agency action were heard at an evidentiary hearing 
on March 18-20, 1997. IR-162 through 164. Pursuant to a 
scheduling order issued September 12, 1996, the Board allotted 27 
hours to hear the evidence. IR-17 SI"7. It allocated 12 hours to 
the Sierra Club, 5 hours to the Executive Secretary and 10 hours 
to the Army and EG&G, collectively. id. Because of the limited , 
hearing time, the Board invited the parties to submit direct 
testimony by declaration, provided the declarant would be present 
at the hearing for cross-examination and to respond to the 
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Board's questions. IR-75 53. The Army submitted the direct 
testimony of six witnesses by declaration prior to the hearing. 
IR-147-154, 156, 158-160. The Executive Secretary submitted the 
direct testimony of three witnesses by declaration. IR-138a 
through 138c. The Sierra Club did not submit any declarations. 
During the course of the hearing, the Board heard from 16 
•witnesses and received 61 exhibits. The Army called experts in 
the fields of health risk assessment, medical toxicology, 
incinerator technology and quantitative risk assessment as 
witnesses. IR-163 at 695: IR-164 at 836, 781, 883. Each of 
these witnesses, as well as the Army's two fact witnesses, 
responded to the Board's questions. Although the Sierra Club 
listed 17 experts on its pre-heanng expert witness list, IR-19, 
it offered no expert testimony at the hearing. Because the 
Sierra Club used most of its time presenting its case in chief, 
•leaving little time for cross-examination of -opposing witnesses, 
the Board granted the Sierra Club additional time. IR-164 at 
731-38, 1043-44. In addition, the State, EG&G and the Army ceded 
portions of their time to the Sierra Club to enable it to examine 
witnesses. See, e.g., IR-163 at 905-906; IR-164 at 1090-1091. 
During the course of the three-day hearing, the Sierra Club used 
over 15 hours, the State approximately 1 hour and Army and EG&G 
collectively less than 9 hours. See IR-164 at 1077.lf 
11
 Because there was no calculation of time at the end of the 
hearing, the final figures must be derived using earlier 
(continued...) 
On the last day of the hearing, the Board rejected a motion 
by the Sierra Club to amend the scheduling order to provide the 
Sierra Club an unspecified amount of time to conduct additional 
cross-examination, 2.5 additional hours to conduct direct and 
redirect examination of an additional witness and three 
additional hours to present rebuttal evidence. IR-177; IR-164 at 
737-38. 
Board's Decision. The Board heard closing arguments on 
April 17, 1997. IR-169. Following discussion, the Board voted 8 
to 1 to deny the first and second requests for agency action. 
IR-169 at 1243-44. 
The Board issued its Order containing findings of fact and 
conclusions of law on July 22, 1997. IR-173. The Board found 
that TOCDF does not pose an imminent threat to human health. Id. 
at 4 SI10. In making this finding, the Board relied upon the 
testimony presented and the screening health risk assessment 
performed by the Utah Department of Solid and Hazardous Waste 
("DSHW") contractor, A.T. Kearney. Id. at 4-6 fll-16. The Board 
found that the screening health risk assessment was conducted in 
accordance with United States Environmental Protection Agency 
17
 ( . . . continued) 
calculations. As of 2:30 p.m. on March 20, the Sierra Club had 
used over 14 hours, the Army & EG&G 7 hours and 42 minutes (which 
included time the Army ceded to the Sierra Club), and the State 
used 26 minutes, which included 10 minutes ceded to the Sierra 
Club. IR-164 at 1076-77. The hearing concluded two hours later, 
and the Sierra Club used over half of that time, based in part on 
time ceded to it by the Army, the State and the Board. I_d. at 
906, 1043-44, 1076. 
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("EPA11) guidance and showed that potential health risks to 
hypothetical individuals located at points of maximum off-site 
emissions were at or below EPA risk levels. Id. at 4-5 5511-13. 
The Board also found that the risks associated with predicted 
dioxin emissions, including risks to breast-fed infants, were 
below a level of concern. Id. at 5-6 5514-16. 
The Board rejected the Sierra Club's contention that the 
permit should be revoked because of operational incidents 
occurring at TOCDF since commencement of agent operations. Id. 
at 7 5519-22. The Board found that recent TOCDF operations have 
been carried out to ensure that full-scale operations will be 
conducted in a manner that maximizes the protection of workers, 
the public and the environment. Id. at 7 520. The Board found 
that the incidents identified by the Sierra Club had not resulted 
in harm to TOCDF personnel, the public or the environment. Id. 
at 8 521. Moreover, the Board found that corrective actions had 
been taken in response to each event and were adequately 
addressed by DSHW, the Army and EG&G. Id. at 8 521. 
In its conclusions of law, the Board held that the Sierra 
Club had failed to provide data or present evidence indicating 
that the Executive Secretary's approval of the trial burn plans 
was inappropriate or not in accordance with law. Id- at 10 
554-5. The Board recognized the importance of the trial burn to 
understanding any emissions at TOCDF and to provide a reasoned 
basis to approve full-scale activity at TOCDF once the trial 
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burns are completed. Xd. at 10 SISI4 — 5. The Board concluded that 
the preponderance of the evidence supported the Executive 
Secretary's approval of TOCDF1s trial burn plans, permit and 
permit modifications. Xd. at 11 58. 
With respect to the allegation that the Executive Secretary 
improperly added EG&G to the permit as a co-operator, the Board 
concluded that the Executive Secretary acted "within his 
discretion and in accordance with applicable rules and statutes." 
Id. at 9 12. In addition, the Board noted that "at no time was 
TOCDF constructed or operated without a permit." Id. 
Related Proceedings in Federal Court. The proceedings below 
are related to a parallel proceeding before the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah. In June 1996, the 
Sierra Club filed a motion for preliminary injunction to prevent 
commencement of agent operations at TOCDF. Following a nine-day 
evidentiary hearing at which the Sierra Club raised many of the 
issues relating to the health risk assessment that it raises in 
this case, the district court denied the request for injunctive 
relief. Chemical Weapons Working Group v. Pep't of Army, 935 F. 
Supp. 1206 (D. Utah 1996). This decision was upheld on appeal. 
Chemical Weapons Working Group, v. Dep't Of Army, 111 F.3d 1485 
(10th Cir. 1997). The Sierra Club filed a second motion for 
preliminary injunction in federal court on January 11, 1997, in 
which it raised many of the operational events also raised before 
the Board. Following a five-day evidentiary hearing, this second 
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motion was denied. Chemical Weapons Working Group v. Dep't Of 
Army, 963 F. Supp. 1083 (D. Utah 1997). 
C• Statement of Facts 
1. TOCDF Background. The United States currently 
possesses over 30,000 tons of unitary chemical agents in its 
chemical weapons stockpile. Approximately 13,000 tons of agent 
are stored at Deseret Army Depot (formerly Tooele Army Depot). 
IR-150 $2. A portion of these chemical agents are currently 
stored in projectiles, mines, rockets and other munitions 
containing explosive components. JA. Other chemical agents are 
stored in munitions that do not contain explosives and in steel 
containers holding bulk agent. Id. 
In June 1989, the Executive Secretary issued a hazardous 
waste storage and treatment permit for TOCDF. IR-149 at 529.. The 
Army completed construction of TOCDF in 1993. IR-149 Sill. 
TOCDF includes a set of five incinerators: (a) two liquid 
incinerators that are used to incinerate liquid agent that has 
been drained from munitions and bulk containers; (b) a 
deactivation furnace system that is used to incinerate munitions 
containing propellants and explosives; (c) a metal parts furnace 
that is used to thermally decontaminate metal parts that have 
been drained of agent, such as bulk containers; and (d) a dunnage 
incinerator that may be used to burn dunnage such as pallets and 
spent carbon filters. IR-149 SI7. 
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2. Trial Burns. Pursuant to DSHW's regulations and 
the terms of the permit, the Army has scheduled a series of trial 
burns at TOCDF. IR-149 511; IR-163 at 562-64. The Executive 
Secretary required that the Army successfully complete trial 
burns with non-agent chemicals before approval of trial burns 
with chemical agents. IR-149 5511, 12. Therefore, in 1995, the 
Army began operational testing using surrogates. I_d. 5518-19. 
Pursuant to Utah Admin. R315-8-15.3(b)(1), the Army performed 
trial burns on the deactivation furnace system and the liquid 
incinerators using surrogate chemicals chosen to be as difficult 
to burn as chemical agent. In addition, the Army conducted a ?-.,••.;• 
research and development trial burn in 1995 pursuant to the 
requirements of the Toxic Substance Control Act ("TSCA"), which 
was intended to test destruction and removal efficiency 
requirement relating to polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs"). Id. 
5513-20. The results of these burns without agent indicated that 
the deactivation furnace system and liquid incinerators achieved 
the required destruction and removal efficiencies. Id. 5513, 18, 
19. ..: 
3. Risk Assessment. Following completion of the 
surrogate trial burns, and pursuant to the requirements of its 
permit, the Army sought the Executive Secretary's approval for 
its agent trial burn plan. IR-149 511. 
In connection with trial burn plan approval and pursuant to 
guidance issued by EPA, DSHW retained a contractor, A.T. Kearney, 
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to conduct a screening health risk assessment for TOCDF. IR-149 
521; IR-138b Sill. The screening health risk assessment analyzed, 
using conservative operating assumptions, the impacts of expected 
TOCDF emissions on human health and the environment. IR-138d at 
1-2. Using these conservative assumptions and following EPA 
guidance, the health risk assessment modeled the hypothetical 
potential exposure to six persons: an adult and child residing at 
the point of maximum off-site emissions, three different farmers 
residing within six miles of the facility and a subsistence 
fisher. id. at 2. For each of these six individuals, assuming 
simultaneous operation of all five furnaces and other TOCDF 
facilities for periods of 10, 15 and 30 years, the health risk 
assessment determined that the overall cancer risk was at or 
below the EPA guidance level of 1 x 10"5. id. at 59-73. 
Moreover, for each of these six individuals, assuming 
simultaneous operation of all five furnaces and other TOCDF 
facilities for 10, 15 and 30 years, the overall non-cancer risk 
was also at or below EPA-established guidance levels. Id. 
4. Agent Operations. On June 18, 1996, the Executive 
Secretary approved the agent trial burn plan for the deactivation 
furnace system. IR-149 Sill. On June 26, 1996, the Executive 
Secretary approved the agent trial burn plan for the liquid 
incinerators. id.; IR-138b SI9. The Executive Secretary also 
approved the screening health risk assessment prepared by A.T. 
Kearney. IR-138b SI8. 
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The Army commenced agent operations pursuant to the trial 
burn plans on August 22, 1997. IR-150 53. These agent 
operations are part of a "shakedown period" approved by the 
Executive Secretary, which precedes the formal trial burn. Id. 
SI4 . The "shakedown period" is designed to identify possible 
mechanical difficulties, ensure that the facility has reached 
operational readiness and can achieve steady-state operating 
conditions. Xd. 54. As part of the shakedown period, the Army 
conducts a shakedown burn with agent, which is not to exceed 720 
hours per furnace. Utah Admin. R315-3-20(a); IR-162 at 335-36. 
The Army then performs the trial or "demonstration" burn, which 
involves operating the incinerators at near-peak capacity for six 
continuous hours on each of three days to generate the data used 
to evaluate incinerator performance and establish operating 
conditions for TOCDF. IR-150 55. TOCDF may operate following 
the shakedown period upon the approval of the Executive 
Secretary. Utah Admin. R315-3-20(c)• 
As of March 14, 1997, the week prior to the commencement of 
the Board hearing, the Army and EG&G had successfully operated 
the deactivation furnace system for over 569 hours, the metal 
parts furnace for over 230 hours and the two liquid incinerators 
for over 736 hours combined. IR-150 55. As a result, over 
11,000 rockets, 173 ton containers and 381,750 pounds of nerve 
agent had been successfully treated. Xd. 54. 
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Since commencement of agent operations in August 1996, three 
events occurred that caused the Army immediately to shut down 
operations: (i) detection of low levels of agent in two filter 
unit containment vestibules; (ii) seepage of a small quantity of 
decontamination fluid through hair-line cracks in a second level 
cement floor to a first floor electrical room; and (iii) minor 
agent migration into an observation corridor. Xd. 317. The first 
and third of these incidents involved trace amounts of chemical 
agent migrating to areas where agent is not supposed to be 
present. Xd. 317. Thorough investigations were conducted 
following each event and corrective action undertaken; the events 
did not recur. I_d. 31318-26. The Executive Secretary was notified 
of each event, received investigation reports, and concurred in 
each of the corrective actions. IR-150 519, 20, 26; IR-138b S114. 
None of these events resulted in harm to TOCDF personnel, the 
public or the environment. IR-150 317. 
TOCDF has experienced other less significant operational 
events during the shakedown period that did not result in a 
shutdown of operations. Xd. 3127. These include: (i) the 
facility1s response to the loss of electrical power at the site; 
(ii) a temporary imbalance in the heating ventilating and air 
conditioning ("HVAC") system created during the testing of the 
fire suppression system; and (iii) a subcontractor's employee 
caught falsifying data entries relating to a trial burn run. Id. 
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Throughout the shakedown period, DSHW has engaged in 
extensive oversight of TOCDF operations. IR-138b 513(d); IR-173 
at 7 SI20. Although the Executive Secretary considered the events 
described above as significant and requiring analysis and 
correction, the Executive Secretary did not believe that any one 
or all of them indicate that TOCDF cannot be operated safely. 
IR-138b 514. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In the proceeding before the Board, the Board considered 
nine witness declarations, three days of live testimony and 
thousands of pages of exhibits. The Board determined that the 
Sierra Club had not established by a preponderance of the 
evidence a basis to overturn the Executive Secretary's trial burn 
approvals or to revoke the TOCDF permit. On appeal, the Sierra 
Club simply reiterates its view of the harms associated with 
TOCDF. The Sierra Club has not demonstrated that the Board's 
findings were not supported by substantial evidence. This Court 
should reject the Sierra Club's attempt to relitigate its factual 
case here. 
Substantial evidence supports the Board's determination that 
normal operations pursuant to the trial burn plan will not 
endanger human health or the environment. The screening health 
risk assessment showed risks at or below guidance levels. The 
testimony of DSHW employees and DSHWs contractor supported the 
Board's conclusion that the risk assessment was prepared in an 
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appropriate and conservative manner. The Army's risk assessment 
expert presented additional evidence that dioxin and other risks 
associated with the trial burn plan were far below levels of 
concern. The Army's medical toxicologist testified that the 
levels of dioxin estimated to be emitted from TOCDF are unlikely 
to produce adverse human health consequences. The Sierra Club 
offered no expert testimony on the question of imminent harm and 
did not present any numerical estimates of risk in excess of EPA 
risk assessment guidance levels. 
Substantial evidence supports the Board's finding that the 
operational history of TOCDF justifies proceeding with the trial 
burn plan. During the shakedown period, certain events occurred 
in the process of reaching operational readiness. Each of these 
events was promptly identified. Each resulted in an 
investigation into cause and implementation of corrective action. 
None have recurred. Neither the public nor the environment was 
harmed. The Executive Secretary and DSHW were notified and 
consulted, and they approved the corrective actions taken. The 
testimony of the Executive Secretary, DSHW staff, and the Army's 
incineration expert all supported the Board's conclusion and 
decision on this issue. 
As a matter of law, the Executive Secretary acted well 
within his discretion to approve the permit modification to add 
EG&G to the permit to operate TOCDF. At no time was TOCDF 
constructed or operated without a permit. Nothing in applicable 
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federal or state law supports the Sierra Club's charge that the 
Executive Secretary acted improperly regarding the manner, timing 
or fact of adding EG&G as a co-permitee. 
With respect to the Sierra Club's due process claims, the 
Board provided the Sierra Club with ample opportunity to present 
its case on the merits. In light of the circumstances, the Board 
acted within its discretion and without violating the Sierra 
Club's due process rights in denying the Sierra Club's motion for 
additional time in which to present evidence. The fact that the 
Board, the State, the Army and EG&G all gave additional time to 
the Sierra Club in which to examine witnesses further attests to 
the fair, if not generous, treatment accorded the Sierra Club 
during the proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE BOARD'S DECISION UPHOLDING THE APPROVAL OF THE ARMY'S 
TRIAL BURN PLAN IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
The Executive Secretary's approval of a trial burn plan is 
one of the steps in the lengthy, detailed procedures for the 
permitting and approval of facilities treating and disposing of 
hazardous wastes by incineration. Utah Admin. R315-3-20; see 
generally Utah Admin. R315-3-1, ££. seq.; R315-8-15. The purpose 
of the trial burn plan is allow initial facility operations which 
can then assist the Executive Secretary in the establishment of 
final operating procedures for the facility. Utah Admin. R315-3-
20(a); R315-3-20(b)(10). 
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The Board's regulations governing hazardous waste 
incinerators establish the standard for approval of a trial burn 
plan. The Executive Secretary shall approve a plan if 
a. The trial burn is likely to determine whether the 
incinerator performance standard is met; 
b. The trial burn itself will not present an imminent 
hazard to human health or the environment; 
c. The trial burn will help the Executive Secretary 
determine operating requirements; and 
d. The information sought in (a) and (b) above cannot 
reasonably be developed by other means. 
Utah Admin. R315-3-20(b) (5) (a)- (d) . The Sierra Club primarily 
challenges the Board's determination that the trial burn will not 
present an imminent hazard to human health and the environment. 
As discussed below, the Board's determination that neither normal 
emissions from TOCDF nor its operational history justify denial 
of the Army's trial burn plan is supported by substantial 
evidence. 
A. The Surrogate Trial Burns Support the Approval of the 
Trial Burn Plan. 
Prior to the Executive Secretary's approval of the the 
Army's agent trial burn plans, the Executive Secretary required, 
and the Army completed, trial burns with surrogate chemicals. 
IR-149, $512, 17. Substantial evidence supports the Board's 
finding that these trial burns showed the Army could meet the 
regulatory destruction and removal efficiencies. IR-149 SIS118, 
19; IR-153 SI48. These results demonstrate TOCDF1 s ability to 
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operate as intended and destroy waste efficiently, and thereby 
support the Board's determination that trial burns with agent 
would not pose an imminent hazard to human health or the 
environment. 
B. Substantial Evidence, in the Form of the Screening 
Health Risk Assessment and Expert Testimony, Supports 
the Board's Finding that Anticipated Emissions From 
TOCDF Will Not Present an Imminent Hazard to Human 
Health and the Environment. 
1. The Screening Health Risk Assessment 
Conservatively Estimated Risks. 
The first stage of a health risk assessment is a screening 
risk assessment, which is prepared prior to commencement of 
operations. The purpose of a screening health risk assessment 
to provide a conservative estimate of the possible risk of heal 
hazards posed by chemical emissions from a facility. IR-158 
at 2. In a screening risk assessment, default assumptions 
contained in EPA guidance, which are designed to overestimate 
exposure and risk, are used to calculate potential health risks 
from a particular activity. IR-138a 59. A screening risk 
assessment does not, and is not intended to, define the actual 
risk of an activity. Id-; IR-158 at 2. 
If a screening risk assessment using default assumptions 
shows that the risk is clearly acceptable, no further risk 
analysis may be necessary. IR-138a 510. However, because a 
screening health risk assessment is designed to overestimate 
exposure and risk, an initial assessment showing significant 
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risks is intended to be refined using more site-specific 
parameters to provide a better, but still conservative measure of 
risk. IR-158 at 6; IR-138a HSI12-15.17 
The Board's finding that the screening health risk 
assessment prepared for TOCDF used conservative assumptions to 
determine resulting risk estimates is supported by substantial 
evidence. The Board, in its findings of fact, identified three 
of the many conservative assumptions incorporated into the risk 
assessment, all of which are supported by the record. IR-173 at 
5 512; IR-138d at 10, 33-34, 59-73; IR-158 at 7-8; IR-163 at 658 
(seven year operation period). Chris Bittner, DSHW's 
toxicologist, and Helen Sellers, the consultant at A.T. Kearney 
who led the preparation of the risk assessment, testified that 
the risk assessment overstates risk. IR-138a SI12; IR-164 at 971-
72. Dr. Finley, the Army's risk assessment expert, further 
supported the Board's finding by identifying numerous 
conservative factors in addition to those cited by the Board. 
IR-158 at 7-9; IR-164 at 838-844. Taken together, these 
conservative assumptions likely overestimated risk by at least a 
factor of ten. IR-164 at 843-44. Dr. Finley also explained how 
the methodology used to calculate cancer and non-cancer risk 
increases the conservatism of the risk assessment. IR-158 at 5. 
17
 The screening risk assessment is just the first stage of the 
risk assessment process. Utah has already started preparing a 
final health risk assessment, which will be based upon actual 
TOCDF trial burn data and any changes in EPA guidance. IR-164 at 
1042-43, 1056. 
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No one testified that the screening risk assessment was not 
based upon appropriately conservative assumptions. 
2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Board's 
Determination that Risks From TOCDF's Emissions 
Are Below a Level of Concern. 
The Board's findings regarding risks from TOCDF emissions 
are supported by the screening health risk assessment, the 
testimony of DSHW employees and its contractor, the additional 
risk calculations presented by Dr. Finley and the medical opinion 
of Dr. Guzelian. 
The Board found that the screening health risk assessment 
was prepared in accordance both with EPA guidance and with 
accepted risk assessment practice. This finding was supported by 
the testimony of Ms. Shilton, Ms. Sellers, Mr. Bittner and Dr. 
Finley. IR-138c SI3; IR-164 at 947-48, 966-68; IR-164 at 844; 
IR-138a 5116, 18, 20; IR-158 at 10, 12. No one testified that the 
risk assessment was inconsistent with EPA guidance or otherwise 
employed improper methodology. 
The screening health risk assessment itself directly 
supports the Board's finding regarding estimated health risks. 
The risk assessment modeled exposures to six hypothetical 
individuals: an adult and child residing at the point of maximum 
off-site emissions, three different farmers modeled upon site-
specific data and a subsistence fisher. IR-138d at 15-19. The 
risks calculated for the six modeled individuals, assuming 
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simultaneous and continuous operation of all five furnaces at 
TOCDF for thirty years, were at or below EPA guidance levels. 
Id. at 56-75. No one testified that these calculations were 
erroneous. 
The Board's finding of an absence of imminent hazard 
attributable to dioxin emissions is supported by substantial 
evidence. IR-173 at 5. The Board correctly determined that the 
risk assessment calculated overall cancer risks from TOCDF 
emissions, including those associated with dioxin, and found they 
do not exceed EPA guidance levels, even for a 30-year operating 
period. IR-138d at 56-75. Moreover, the Board received 
substantial evidence in the form of expert testimony that 
potential non-cancer effects of dioxin did not present an 
imminent hazard. Dr. Finley calculated the average daily intakes 
of dioxin for the six hypothetical individuals modeled in the 
screening risk assessment. IR-158 at 13, Table 2. Using EPA 
guidance methodology, Dr. Finley performed a screening risk 
assessment for these hypothetical dioxin exposures and testified 
that these exposures should be below a level of concern for non-
cancer effects as well. id. The Board's finding was further 
supported by the testimony of Dr. Guzelian, a medical 
toxicologist, who testified that that the low level exposures to 
dioxin that may be caused by operation of TOCDF are unlikely to 
produce adverse human health consequences. IR-159 at 7. The 
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Sierra Club offered no expert testimony to support an opposing 
view. 
Finally, and most significantly, the Board's finding that no 
imminent hazard was presented is supported by the testimony of 
Dr. Finley related to risks associated with the trial burn plans. 
Dr. Finley testified that cancer and non-cancer risks for an 
assumed one-year agent trial burn phase are orders of magnitude 
below EPA guidance levels. IR-158 at 13, Table 10; IR-164 at 
855-56. The Sierra Club presented no calculation of risks 
specifically for the agent trial burn phase. Thus, the only 
evidence presented at the hearing related to risks associated 
with the agent trial burn plans demonstrated without 
contradiction that "the trial burn itself will not present an 
imminent hazard to human health and the environment." Utah 
Admin. Code R315-3-20(b)(5)(b)(emphasis added). Indeed, the 
record could not support a contrary conclusion. 
In light of this overwhelming evidence, the Board's decision 
was reasonable and rational. See Grace Drilling, 778 P.2d at 68. 
3. The Sierra Club's Arguments Related to the Risk 
Resulting From Emissions from TOCDF Are Not Based 
Upon Substantial Evidence in the Record As a 
Whole . 
The Sierra Club, lacking expert testimony to support its 
arguments, attempted to demonstrate an imminent hazard before the 
Board by asserting that risks associated with dioxin emissions 
pose an imminent hazard and by hypothesizing scenarios more 
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conservative than those used in the screening health risk 
assessment. Both arguments failed before the Board. The Board's 
reliance on the screening risk assessment was justified. In 
addition, the Board appropriately relied on the expert testimony 
presented to support its finding of no imminent hazard. 
a. The Board's Rejection of The Sierra Club's 
Dioxin Arguments is Supported by Substantial 
Evidence. 
The subject of the health effects associated with dioxin 
exposure, particularly low level exposures, is a topic of 
considerable controversy and scientific attention. IR-159 at 5 
511-12; IR-138a M16, 18. The Sierra Club unsuccessfully raised 
two related challenges to DSHW's treatment of dioxin emissions 
from TOCDF. First, it contested the method the screening health 
risk assessment used to handle non-cancer risks of dioxin. 
Second, it contended that significant adverse health effects are 
attributable to low level dioxin exposures. The Board's Order 
evidences an understanding of this complex topic and its 
rejection of the Sierra Club's arguments is supported by 
substantial evidence. 
An understanding of the Sierra Club's argument regarding 
the appropriate method for handling the non-cancer effects of 
dioxin emissions in risk assessments must start with the concept 
of a reference dose. A reference dose is intended to represent 
the daily intake level of a chemical that is unlikely to produce 
an adverse health effect over a lifetime of exposure. IR-158 at 
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6-7. Reference doses are calculated in a conservative manner to 
be protective of the general human population, including 
sensitive sub-populations. id. at 6. For example, a reference 
dose generally is calculated based on the highest dose at which 
no observed adverse health effects are observed, usually in 
animals. id. This level is then adjusted for "uncertainty 
factors" applied to that dose level depending on the adequacy of 
the data. IR-159 at SI 13. These adjustments may include dividing 
the "no effects" level by ten to account for variations in the 
sensitivity found in the general population, dividing by ten 
again to account for uncertainty in extrapolating animal data to 
humans, and dividing by ten again to account for not knowing the 
precise dose at which "no effect" will occur. id.; IR-158 at 5. 
Thus, reference doses for chemicals are set conservatively 
at orders of magnitude below the level at which no adverse health 
effects are observed. IR-158 at 5. For purposes of risk 
assessment analysis, EPA guidance sets the target risk level at 
25% of the the reference doses. IR-138a SISI6, 7. 
In the case of dioxin, EPA has not set a reference dose. 
IR-138a SI16, 18. Nonetheless, there are data available which can 
form the basis to estimate a "safe" dose. IR-158 at 12, Table 1. 
Dr. Finley calculated dioxin exposures to the six individuals 
modeled in the risk assessment. IR-158 at 12-13. Using the 
1 picogram/kg-day "reference dose" suggested by the Sierra Club, 
Appellants' Opening Brief (hereinafter "Sierra Club Brief") at 
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19-20, none of these hypothetical individuals had an exposure 
above the EPA target level of 25% of the reference dose. id. 
IR-158 at 13, Table 2. Thus, the calculations of Dr. Finley 
strongly support the Board's findings that non-cancer risks 
attributable to dioxin do not justify revocation of the TOCDF 
trial burn approvals. 
The Board also properly rejected the Sierra Club's related 
contention that current background levels of dioxin exposure pose 
a health risk.-7 Substantial evidence was presented in rebuttal 
to this argument. EPA's Science Advisory Board, the group 
charged with reviewing certain EPA documents, stated that EPA has 
not presented evidence to support the conclusion that adverse 
effects in humans may be occurring near current exposure levels. 
IR-159 at 5 511-12. In addition, Dr. Guzelian testified that low 
level environmental exposures to dioxin are unlikely to produce 
adverse human health consequences. IR-159 at 7 SI15; IR-164 at 
791-795. Dr. Guzelian supported his expert opinion with an 
extensive review of applicable studies and toxicological 
literature. IR-159, Appendices. 
In conclusion, the Sierra Club presented no evidence that 
the levels of dioxin emitted from TOCDF during the agent trial 
burn will cause an imminent hazard to human health or the 
environment. Rather, the Board heard evidence that preliminary 
*' Background levels are those exposures attributable to 
sources other than the combustion units being assessed. 
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results of the January 1997 deactivation furnace system trial 
burn showed levels of dioxin emissions from the deactivation 
system furnace roughly equivalent to the dioxin emissions of six 
residential fireplaces. IR-164 at 847-50. In the absence of 
evidence of an imminent hazard, the Board's findings are rational 
and reasonable. 
b. There was no evidence that more conservative 
scenarios would result in an imminent hazard 
to the public or the environment during the 
trial burn phase of operations. 
The Sierra Club correctly identified target levels for risk 
in the context of a screening health risk assessment: a cancer 
risk at or below 1 x 10"5 and a hazard index, based on reference 
doses, of less than or equal to §.2b.-f Sierra Club Brief at 
15-16. However, the Sierra Club did not present any calculation 
of a cancer risk or a hazard index for the agent trial burn 
phase, much less a calculation showing risk values above the 
target levels. Instead, the Sierra Club took the scenario that 
produced the highest cancer risk (Farmer C) and tried to layer 
dairy consumption, breast-fed infants and other conservative 
factors on top of this risk to establish an imminent hazard. 
-
1
 For purposes of risk assessments for RCRA-permitted 
combustion facilities, EPA guidance indicates that the total 
incremental risk from the high-end individual exposure to 
carcinogenic constituents should not exceed 1 x 10~5. IR-138a 
54. This corresponds to a 1 in 100,000 chance of developing 
cancer as a result of exposure under the particular conservative 
scenario being evaluated; it does not mean one person in a 
population of 100,000 will develop cancer because the 
conservative nature of the analysis does not reflect actual 
scenarios. See IR-158 at 2. 
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Sierra Club Brief at 36-37. The Board properly rejected this 
argument. 
First, the Sierra Club's use of the 1 x 10'5 cancer risk for 
Farmer C calculated in the screening risk assessment bears no 
meaningful relationship to the actual risks to Farmer C 
associated with the agent trial burn plans. The screening risk 
assessment, using its numerous conservative assumptions to 
calculate potential health risks, calculated a 1 x 10"5 cancer 
risk for Farmer C for a 30-year operating period during which all 
furnaces are operated at full capacity, 24 hours per day, 365 
days per year. IR-164 at 975. In contrast, the Executive 
Secretary has only approved operation of four of the five 
furnaces, for one of the three agents, for a period not likely to 
exceed a year or two. The closest the screening risk assessment 
comes to modeling this scenario is a calculation of full-scale 
operation of the four furnaces with all three agents for ten 
years. This scenario yields a risk of 3 x 10"e, a risk one-third 
below the EPA target level. Much more probative is the risk for 
Farmer C of 4 x 10'b calculated by Dr. Finley using the 
parameters of the trial burn plan. IR-158, Table 10. Thus, no 
evidence was presented that adding dairy consumption or a breast-
fed infant to Farmer C's household would cause the potential risk 
to exceed the EPA target level of 1 x 10*5 during the trial burn 
phase. 
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Second, substantial evidence supports the Board's rejection 
of the Sierra Club's contention that the risk assessment needed 
to consider home-grown dairy consumption in order to model 
accurately risks to the public residing in proximity to TOCDF. 
DSHW undertook a survey of farming practices in the area 
surrounding TOCDF and did not locate anyone consuming milk from 
animals raised on their property. IR-164 at 993-94. 
Significantly, the Sierra Club presented no witnesses who engaged 
in or knew of anyone who engaged in subsistence dairy farming in 
the arid property surrounding TOCDF. As the United States 
District Court stated in rejecting similar arguments at the 
hearing on the Sierra Club's motion for preliminary injunction, 
"a showing that the assumptions used in the risk assessment may 
indicate a higher level of risk for some hypothetical person 
. . . does not constitute a showing that there is an actual risk 
to some person posed by the emissions levels predicted for the 
facility." Chemical Weapons Working Group, 935 F. Supp. at 1214. 
Third, substantial evidence supports the Board's rejection 
of the Sierra Club's contention that the risk assessment needed 
to consider risks to breast-fed infants in order to accurately 
model risks to the public. Applicable EPA guidance does not call 
for modeling breast-fed infants. IR-164 at 936-37; IR-158 at 13; 
IR-164 at 844. y In any event, the Board had the benefit of 
1J
 Notwithstanding the Sierra Club's allegation of gross 
negligence or intentional bias in conducting the screening risk 
(continued.. 
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calculations showing the risks to breast-fed infants associated 
with the TOCDF agent trial burn plan, and this evidence supported 
the Board's decision. Dr. Finley conservatively modeled the 
exposures to a breast-fed infant during the trial burn phase and 
determined that the exposures were below a level of concern. 
IR-158 at 13; IR-164 at 1025-26. The Sierra Club presented no 
evidence that breast-fed infant exposures during a trial burn 
phase exceeded any target level.i7 
The Board's rejection of the Sierra Club's additional 
arguments -- that the screening risk assessment was flawed for 
failure to consider open burning/open detonation activities 
(ffOB/ODM) and mustard gas emissions from the HVAC -- is supported 
by substantial evidence. 
The Sierra Club erroneously contends that the screening risk 
assessment should model risks for OB/OD prior to commencement of 
the agent trial burn. DSHW has prohibited the Army from 
conducting OB/OD operations until a risk assessment modeling 
2/
 ( . . . continued) 
assessment, Sierra Club Brief at 17, the testimony of Ms. 
Sellers, Mr. Bittner and Dr. Finley all established that the 
decision not to include a breast-fed infant scenario was 
consistent with EPA screening risk assessment guidance and risk 
assessment practice. IR-138a at SI17; IR-158 at 7, 13/ IR-164 at 
936-37. 
fi/
 Instead, the Sierra Club relied on a 50 picogram/day dose 
figure calculated in a draft of the screening risk assessment for 
an infant breast-fed by a woman exposed to 30 years of TOCDF 
emissions, Sierra Club Brief at 37 and PX-4, and critiqued Dr. 
Finley's calculation because it did not account for dioxin 
accumulation in breast milk that would occur over a 10 or 20 year 
exposure period. IR-164 at 1030-31. 
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risks associated with that activity is performed and risks are 
shown to be acceptable. IR-164 at 1050-51. This has not yet 
occurred. IR-164 at 1054-56. Therefore, the record supports the 
Board's finding that any risks associated with with OB/OD 
activities are not imminent. 
The issue raised by the Sierra Club related to the modeling 
of mustard emissions from the HVAC system is also irrelevant to 
the determinations made by the Board. Quite simply, the 
Executive Secretary has not approved any incineration activities 
with mustard. IR-163 at 655-56. Activities involving mustard 
are estimated to start in late 2001 or 2002. IR-163 at 616. 
Therefore, any risks associated with incineration of munitions 
containing mustard agent are not imminent; they must await 
further applications to and approvals from the Executive 
Secretary .*-' 
In conclusion, the Sierra Club has not met its burden to 
marshal all of the evidence supporting the Board's findings on 
TOCDF emissions risks and shown that, despite these supporting 
facts, the findings of the Board are not supported by substantial 
evidence. 
- In any event, Ms. Sellers and Ms. Shilton adequately 
explained the change to the risk assessment that relates to the 
modeling of mustard emissions from the HVAC system and why it 
still constituted a conservative assumption. IR-164 at 931-32; 
996-97, 1015-16. 
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II. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE BOARD'S FINDING THAT THE 
INCIDENTS OCCURRING DURING THE SHAKEDOWN PERIOD DO NOT 
JUSTIFY DENIAL OF THE ARMY'S REQUEST FOR TRIAL BURN PLAN 
APPROVAL OR REVOCATION OF ITS PERMIT. 
The record provides substantial evidence that TOCDF is being 
operated in a safe manner, and does not endanger human health or 
the environment. Events typical for a shakedown period occurred 
during the first six month of agent operations, and each such 
event was followed by an appropriate response. Investigations 
were performed. Corrective actions were taken in all cases. 
Significantly, none of the events have recurred. Based upon this 
record, the Board had more than substantial evidence to affirm 
the Executive Secretary's approval of the agent trial burn plans, 
Utah Admin. Code R315-3-20, and not revoke or terminate the 
permit. Utah Admin. Code R315-3-16(a)(3). 
In this appeal, the Sierra Club repeats a litany of factual 
allegations to support its position but fails to identify facts 
in the record that show that the Board's findings were 
unreasonable. Moreover, it fails to show that, despite the 
supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or 
contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence. Rather, the Sierra Club simply recites its 
abridged history of TOCDF operations to have this Court 
substitute its judgment for that of the Board. 
The evidence presented to the Board supporting its decision 
is overwhelming. The Board heard numerous witnesses testify as 
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to the operational safety of TOCDF. Mr. Downs testified that 
incineration and other waste handling activities at TOCDF, if 
performed in accordance with permit requirements, are and will be 
done in a manner that protects human health and the environment. 
IR-138b 513. Mr. Downs based his determination on the facility 
design, which meets or exceeds all regulatory requirements, the 
facility's redundant safety features, and DSHWfs extensive 
oversight of TOCDF. Id. 
The testimony of the witnesses called by the Army also 
supported the Board's decision. Mr. Thomas, the Army Site 
Manager, testified regarding the safety and environmental 
compliance of the facility. IR-154; IR-164 at 894-96. Mr. 
Holmes, TOCDF Associate Project Manager, explained in detail many 
of the events occurring at TOCDF since commencement of agent 
operations. IR-150 W - 2 6 ; IR-163 at 571-666. The Army's 
incineration expert, Mr. Cudahy, testified that TOCDF is a state-
of-the-art facility that is properly installed and will be safely 
and effectively maintained and operated. IR-153 SI 9 9. As noted 
by Mr. Cudahy, the important aspect of the various shakedown 
events is that facility engineering controls and operational 
procedures worked as intended and there was no confirmed release 
of agent. IR-152 at M7-13. 
In contrast, no one testified at the hearing that the events 
during shakedown at TOCDF endanger human health or the 
environment, or that they presage any endangerment. 
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To support their allegations of operational deficiencies the 
Sierra Club provides an incomplete picture of a variety of 
operational events. As part of the methodical process during 
shakedown to ensure that TOCDF operations will provide maximum 
protection to workers, the public and the environment, three 
events prompted the Army to cease operations. IR-150 16. 
Following each of these three events - agent present in a 
vestibule, a leak of decontamination solution in a processing 
area and minor agent migration into an observation corridor — the 
Army or EG&G undertook a thorough investigation. IR-150 SISI15 — 17, 
23, 25. The investigations yielded corrective action — 
reconfiguring dampers in the HVAC system, a sealing of concrete 
cracks and a concrete inspection program, and installation of 
additional corridor alarms and additional training regarding 
operating procedures. IR-150 1119, 23, 26; IR-163 at 611-12. 
The Army notified the Executive Secretary of each of these events 
and the Executive Secretary and DSHW approved the corrective 
action. IR-150 1519-20, 26; IR-138b Tll4. Since the occurrence 
of each of these events, there has been no agent detected in the 
vestibule, no leaking of fluid through concrete cracks and no 
agent detected in the observation corridors. IR-150 119; IR-154 
19. 
The Board's findings that these events were properly 
addressed and did not result in harm are fully supported by the 
evidence. IR-173 at 8 121. The testimony of Mr Holmes, Mr. 
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Thomas and Mr. Downs provided an adequate description of the 
events and the corrective action taken in response. See IR-150 
558-43; IR-154 558-11. The Board's finding that none of these 
events resulted in harm to TOCDF personnel, the public or the 
environment was directly supported by the testimony of Mr. 
Holmes. IR-150 57. 
The Board's findings in paragraph 19 of the Board's decision 
regarding the evidence presented by the Sierra Club relating to 
certain other events at TOCDF are reasonable. IR-173 at 7 519. 
The Board's finding concerning the adequacy of electrical power 
back-up is fully supported by Mr. Holmes' thorough description of 
the electrical power system and his testimony that the backup 
power system has operated upon a loss of power. IR-163 at 
587-89. The Board heard testimony explaining the the Army's 
prompt response to the temporary HVAC imbalance during 
maintenance of the fire suppression system and the corrective 
training provided that has prevented a recurrence of this event. 
IR-150 534; IR-163 at 592-94. The Board heard lengthy testimony 
from Mr. Holmes regarding the "hot cut-out" procedures that are 
an expected part of operations and for which workers are 
appropriately equipped. IR-163 at 602-09. 
The Board made specific findings concerning an event 
involving the falsification of data on a trial burn monitoring 
report, all of which are supported by substantial evidence. 
IR-173 at 2 53, 9 53. Both EG&G and DSHW discovered the 
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falsification the day it occurred and immediately reported the 
incident. E-2; IR-163 at 683-84. The responsible employee, who 
was employed by a subcontractor to assist in data collection 
during the trial burn, was terminated. IR-163 at 682-83. The 
trial burn data were discarded. IR-163 at 683. Extensive ethics 
training was given by the subcontractor to its employees. IR-163 
at 686-87. An investigation revealed that the employee acted 
alone. Id. at 683. Because the falsification of data related to 
the temperature needed to preserve a sample, and was not part of 
the combustion process, safety at TOCDF was never compromised. 
IR-163 at 596-97. The problem has not recurred. IR-163 at 691. 
The Board's inferences drawn from this evidence are reasonable 
and, therefore, must be affirmed. 
The Board's finding that the stack is appropriately 
monitored for agent emissions with ACAMS and DAAMS systems is 
supported by substantial evidence.•"•' The Board heard extensive 
testimony from Ms. Ng and Mr. Holmes regarding operations of the 
air monitoring equipment. IR-162 at 369-394; IR-163 at 400-410, 
584-86. Ms. Ng explained that the many ACAMS readings indicating 
detection of agent shown to her on cross-examination were the 
results of tests, or challenges, and not emissions of agent out 
*&' TOCDF uses two monitoring systems for detecting the 
presence of chemical agent. An ACAMs system is used to determine 
agent concentrations on a near real-time basis. The DAAMs system 
collects agent onto an absorbent material inside a testing tube 
over an extended period of time, and is subsequently analyzed at 
a laboratory for the presence of agents. IR-150 Sill. 
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of the stack. IR-163 at 401. Both Mr. Downs and Mr. Holmes 
testified that there has never been a confirmed release of agent 
at TOCDF. IR-150 537; IR-162 at 1 1 0 - 1 1 1 . ^ ^ 
Regarding the Sierra Club's allegation of low level agent 
releases, Sierra Club Brief at 37, the record shows its argument 
is based on a misinterpretation of the data and, even if true, 
would not establish any imminent hazard to human health and the 
environment. The Sierra Clubfs argument is based upon data 
recorded in a range below which agent levels can accurately be 
measured, known as "LOQ". IR-150 537; IR-151 58. This LOQ 
defines the lowest detectible concentration that can be reliably 
measured, considering the sensitivity or calibration range of the 
measuring instrument. IR-150 537. Readings below the LOQ could 
be caused by a number of factors (machine noise, artifacts or 
false positives), but should not be used conclusively to show the 
presence of agent. IR-150 537. In any event, the LOQ is at a 
level approximately equivalent to a GB stack concentration over 
5,500 times less than the maximum allowable regulatory-based GB 
stack concentration. IR-151 57. 
11/
 The Sierra Club relies upon Mr. Thomas' testimony that there 
have been "a confirmed number of alarms on the abatement stack of 
six." Sierra Club Brief at 26-27, 34. The Sierra Club does not 
quote the question to which Mr. Thomas responded, which asked "Do 
you know how many ACAMS alarms have been experienced facility-
wide, whether you consider it to be true or false alarms." IR-
164 at 891. The Sierra Club never clarified whether the six 
alarms mentioned by Mr. Thomas were true alarms reflecting a 
detection of agent. 
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Finally, the Board's determination that the risks of 
fatalities associated with continued storage of agent in 
stockpiles greatly exceeds those associated with accidental 
releases resulting from TOCDF operations, IR-173 at 6-7, is 
directly supported by the testimony of the Army's quantitative 
risk expert, Gary Boyd. A quantitative risk assessment examines 
actual risks associated with accidental releases of agent in the 
context of TOCDF operations. IR-156 531. The quantitative risk 
assessment presents a calculation of the actual probability of 
occurrence of events leading to an accidental release of chemical 
agent and evaluates the potential consequences of such releases 
in terms of fatalities. 1^ .. 559, 16. It also contains a 
comparison of these risks with the risks of accidental releases 
of agent associated with continued storage. id.. Sill. The 
Board's finding that the total risk of accidental fatalities 
associated with TOCDF operations is equivalent to the risks 
associated with only 34 days of continued storage is directly 
supported by Mr. Boyd's testimony regarding quantitative risk. 
Id. 519. Because the Sierra Club's challenges to the 
quantitative risk assessment were rebutted by Mr. Boyd (id. 58; 
IR-163 at 704) this finding is supported by substantial evidence. 
In summary, the evidence of the events themselves, as well 
as the Army's response to them during the shakedown period, amply 
demonstrates that the Sierra Club has not shown that TOCDF poses 
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an imminent hazard, and that the Board's determination is 
supported by substantial evidence. '*.•••'"•?. -
III. THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE BOARD'S CONCLUSION THAT THE 
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PROPERLY ADDED EG&G TO THE PERMIT 
The Sierra Club contends that the "plain language of the 
statute" indicates that the Executive Secretary erred in not 
requiring, at an earlier point in time, that EG&G be added to the 
permit as a co-permitee. See Sierra Club Brief at 39-40. The 
relevant statutory language relied upon by the Sierra Club 
provides as follows: 
No person may own, construct, modify, or operate any 
facility or site for the purpose of disposing of 
nonhazardous waste without first submitting and 
receiving the approval of the executive secretary for a 
nonhazardous solid or hazardous waste operation plan 
for that facility or site. 
Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-108(3) (a). 
In explaining the practical application of this language, 
the Executive Secretary explained during his examination by the 
Sierra Club that it is not unusual for a hazardous waste facility 
to have contractors and subcontractors participating in operating 
the facility, even in a substantial way. However, the existence of 
such contractors does not necessarily mean that they are all 
"operators" of the facility within the meaning of the Utah Solid 
and Hazardous Waste Act. IR-162 at 167-69. Thus, the Executive 
Secretary reasonably interpreted the Act and the extent of his 
discretion by determining that the Army, as owner and operator of 
the facility, could be the sole permitee during the construction 
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and systemization phases. This is especially true given that the 
Army has ultimate responsibility for construction and operation of 
the facility. Id. at 42. Prior to the commencement of operations 
with agent, the Executive Secretary reasonably exercised his 
discretion to add EG&G to the permit given that EG&G would function 
as the primary contractor in operating the facility. Id. at 167. 
Nothing in the statutory language prohibits such an interpretation 
and application of the permit requirements.—7 
Next, the Sierra Club criticizes the Executive Secretary for 
adding EG&G to the permit, in June 1996, because "EG&G had been 
blatantly violating the fundament [sic] rule of the Act, i.e., 
operators must have permits, for at least well over six months. 
In light of this violation, it was error for the Board to approve 
giving EG&G a permit to operate TOCDF.n Sierra Club Brief at 40. 
It is difficult to understand the basis of this argument given 
that EG&G agreed to be added to the permit at the time and in the 
manner requested by the Executive Secretary. IR-162 at 167-69; 
IR-138b SI7. 
• The Sierra Club also argues that the Executive Secretary 
should not have approved the addition of EG&G to the permit in 
12/
 The Sierra Club's reading of the statute would require every 
person or company that participates in the construction or 
operation of a regulated facility to apply for a permit, and the 
Executive Secretary would have no discretion to consider the 
particular circumstances of the facility and the parties 
involved. The Utah Legislature could not have contemplated such 
an unworkable and burdensome result given the complexity of 
permitting these facilities. See generally Utah Admin. R315-3-
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light of various incidents that allegedly demonstrate that EG&G 
personnel lack adequate training to operate TOCDF safely. Sierra 
Club Brief at 41-42. The Court should likewise reject this 
contention. First, the incidents the Sierra Club refers to 
occurred after EG&G was added to the permit. Thus, the Executive 
Secretary could not have considered them in connection with 
processing the permit modification to add EG&G to the permit. 
Second, and most importantly, the record does not support that EG&G 
personnel lack training to operate the plant safely. After 
considering extensive testimony and documentary evidence regarding 
the nature, causes and responses to the alleged incidents, the 
Board concluded as follows: "With proper responses to incidents or 
concerns, appropriate reviews and changes in or temporary 
suspension of operations, the Army and EG&G have operated the 
facility in such a way as to minimize the release of hazardous 
waste and to avoid imminent hazards and mitigate any impacts to 
public health." IR-173 at 4 SI10. The Board's finding that EG&G 
was properly added should stand. 
IV. THE HEARING PROCEDURES DID NOT VIOLATE THE SIERRA CLUB'S DUE 
PROCESS RIGHTS 
The Sierra Club maintains that the Board violated its 
procedural due process rights by allowing it only 12 hours to 
present its case and by denying the Sierra Club's motion for an 
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additional allotment of time.—'' Sierra Club Brief at 44-46. Under 
any standard of review, The Sierra Club's due process claim lacks 
merit.117 
The Sierra Club cannot dispute that the Board provided all 
parties, including the Sierra Club, with all of the procedural 
safeguards available in administrative proceedings, namely trial- • 
like procedures in a formal adjudicative hearing governed by the 
^ The Sierra Club claims violations under both the United 
States Constitution Amendment XIV and Utah Constitution Article 
1, Section 7. The Utah Constitution's due process clause provides 
the same level of protection that the federal due process clause 
provides. Thus, the same standards and analysis apply to both 
claims. In Re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 876 (Utah 1996). 
11/
 The Sierra Club claims that the standard of review that 
governs review of its due process claim is the less deferential 
"correction-of-error" standard. The Army and EG&G do not 
disagree. Under any standard of review, the procedural due 
process afforded the Sierra Club in the proceedings before the 
Board satisfy due process requirements. Nevertheless, the Army 
and EG&G note that courts of appeals generally apply a more 
deferential "abuse of discretion" standard when evaluating 
whether a lower court or administrative agency properly managed 
the case or hearing before it. See, e.g.. Shepherd v. Shepherd, 
876 P.2d 429, 432 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("A trial court has broad 
discretion to determine the manner in which proceedings before it 
are conducted. ... We will not interfere ... unless the trial court 
abused its discretion."); Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. 
Co.. Inc., 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 836 
P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992) (applying abuse of discretion standard to 
review of trial court's case management); Adkins v. Trans-Alaska 
Pipeline Liab. Fund, 101 F.3d 86, 89 (9th Cir. 1996) ("While we 
review due process challenges de novo, ... we defer to an 
administrative agency's fashioning of procedures."); Michigan 
Consol. Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 883 F.2d 
117, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Courts generally accord agencies 
broad discretion in fashioning hearing procedures") (quoting 
Lyons v. Barrett, 851 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1988)); Superior Oil 
Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 563 F.2d 191, 201 (5th 
Cir. 1977) ("agencies are best situated to determine how they 
should allocate their finite resources"). 
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Rules of Evidence. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8. The Sierra Club 
presented opening and closing statements, offered numerous exhibits 
for admission, offered live testimony from witnesses (through 
direct, cross and redirect examinations), filed extensive pre- and 
post-hearing briefs, and offered additional testimony in the form 
of hundreds of pages of transcripts of prior trial and deposition 
testimony from this proceeding and two related federal hearings. 
PX-8; PX-12; IR-163 at 481-82; IR-164 at 795-96, 857. 
Despite the availability of these procedures, the Sierra Club 
nevertheless claims that the Board's formal adjudicative hearing, 
which lasted over three days and generated a transcript 1,244 pages 
in length, did not provide a meaningful opportunity to be heard 
because the Board limited the amount of time the Sierra Club was 
allotted to present its case. The procedural rules governing 
formal adjudication specifically contemplate that the hearing 
officer can impose "reasonable" limits to the length of witness 
testimony, cross-examination and oral argument. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-8(a); Utah Admin. R315-12-6. ;. 
Of course, every losing party can claim that had it been given 
more time to present its case, it would have prevailed. However, 
courts carefully scrutinize such claims and consider the 
reasonableness and adequacy of the procedural protections in light ' 
of the particular facts. See generally Worrall v. Ogden City Fire 
Depft, 616 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah 1980) ("Due process is not a 
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, 
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and circumstances; it is flexible and requires such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands.11).12'7 
The record in the instant case demonstrates that the exercise 
of the Board's discretion to limit the amount of time allowed the 
parties to present their cases was reasonable and did not violate 
the Sierra Club's procedural due process rights. First, the Sierra 
Club knew many months in advance that it was limited to 12 hours to 
present its case, see IR-17 (Order dated Sept. 17, 1996), but did 
not challenge these limits until the third day of the hearing 
(March 20, 1997). IR-164 at 723-24.^7 
Second, in denying the Sierra Club's motion for additional 
time, the Board may have observed how the Sierra Club had used its 
time poorly by conducting lengthy, argumentative and redundant 
—
7
 The Sierra Club relies on several cases to support its claim 
that the time limits imposed on it by the Board constitute, per 
se, substantial prejudice. However, these cases present 
egregious procedural constraints not present in the proceeding 
challenged here. For example, in D.B. v. Division of 
Occupational & Prof'l Licensing, 779 P.2d 1145, 1147 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989), the agency denied complainant any opportunity to 
cross-examine any of the opposing party's witnesses. Similarly, 
in R.W. Jones Trucking, Inc. v. Public Serv, Comm'n, 649 P.2d 628 
(Utah 1982), the complainant had H£ opportunity to present any 
evidence on any of the issues. Finally, in Tolman v. Salt Lake 
County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), the accused 
party was not allowed to cross-examine the accusing party at all. 
^ The Sierra Club specifically objected to the fact that the 
time used by members of the Board to ask questions was counted 
against the party that offered the witness. See IR-164 at 727. 
As a consequence and as a further concession to the Sierra Club, 
the Board allotted the Sierra Club 30 additional minutes to 
offset time the Board used to question the Sierra Club's 
witnesses. IR-164 at 732, 736-38. 
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examination of various adverse witnesses. See Id. at 719 (argument 
in opposition to motion for additional time); see, e.g., IR-162 at 
34-144, 145-149 (lengthy examination by the Sierra Club of Dennis 
Downs even though the Sierra Club had previously offered a two 
volume transcript of its deposition of Dennis Downs into the record 
(IR-68, 70)). The Board remarked upon the need for the Sierra Club 
to use its time appropriately. IR-164 at 729, 732. 
Third, the Board had already gone to great lengths to 
accommodate the Sierra Club's procedural demands. For example, the 
Board delayed and rescheduled proceedings in the case twice at the 
request of the Sierra Club. IR-164 at 729. The Board allocated 
the Sierra Club 12 hours, but the Sierra Club was allowed to use 
over 15 hours. IR-164 at 1076-1077, 1090-1092. In contrast, the 
State used approximately 1 hour and Army and EG&G collectively less 
than 9 hours. IR-164 at 1076-1077. Moreover, the Board accepted 
into evidence, in lieu of live testimony, affidavits, information 
contained in pre-trial briefs, IR-164 at 730, lengthy deposition 
transcripts, IR-163 at 487, transcripts of testimony given in 
federal court, id. at 481-2, IR-164 at 795-96, 857, and lengthy 
diaries which expounded upon one witness's testimony, id. at 517. 
Thus, the Board's imposition of time limits and denial of The 
Sierra Club's motion for additional time were reasonable under the 
circumstances and did not violate the Sierra Club's right to 
procedural due process. In similar circumstances, various courts 
have held that time limitations do not rise to the level of a due 
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process violation. See, e.g., Childs v. Copper Valley Elec. 
Assoc., 860 P.2d 1184, 1190 (Alaska 1993) (holding that time limits 
on testimony were reasonable); Clark v. Board of Dir. of Kansas 
City School Dist., 915 S.W. 2d 766, 772 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) 
(holding that agreed-upon time constraints did not violate party's 
due process rights); In re Application of Lamb, 539 N.W.2d 865, 
866-67 (N.D. 1995) (holding that, despite time limit, complainant 
had ''reasonable opportunities to present and examine witnesses, to 
present evidence, to respond to evidence presented against his 
applications, and to argue his case"). 
Finally, we note that the United States District Court 
for the District of Utah issued a decision on October 14, 1997, in 
which it considered the due process afforded the Sierra Club in the 
hearing before the Board. The district court, in its analysis of 
EG&G's motion to dismiss based on collateral estoppel, concluded 
that the Sierra Club "received all the opportunity for full and 
fair litigation that Utah law or the federal constitution require." 
Chemical Weapons Working Group v. Pep't Of Army, No. 2:96-CV-0425C, 
slip op. at 7 (Oct. 14, 1997) (Campbell, J.) (attached hereto as 
Addendum B). This Court should reach the same conclusion. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons described above, the Army and EG&G 
respectfully request that the Court affirm the Board's decisions. 
DATED this / Q day of December, 1997. 
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Addendum A 
BEFORE THE UTAH SOLID AND HAZARDOUS 
WASTE CONTROL BOARD 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
The Tooele Chemical Agent 
Disposal Facility's Permit * ORDER 
and Permit Modifications 
* 
EPA ID No. UT5210090002 
This matter came before the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board (the Board) 
for hearing on March 18-20 and April 17, 1997 on the First and Second Requests for Agency 
Action by the Petitioners, Chemical Weapons Working Group, Inc., Sierra Club and the Vietnam 
Veterans of America Foundation. Also participating were the Respondents, U.S Department of 
the Army (Army) and EG&G Defense Materials, Inc. (EG&G), and the Executive Secretary. 
The parties were represented by counsel. A quorum of Board members was present and voted on 
the motions resulting in this Order. The hearing was conducted as a formal hearing under the 
authority of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. section 63-46b-l gt seq. 
(1953, as amended), and Utah Admin. Code R315. 
The Board, having reviewed the record in this matter, and upon consideration of the 
pleadings, evidence and arguments of counsel, voted to deny the First and Second Requests for 
Agency Action, for the reasons on that day orally assigned. The Board hereby issues its written 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Statement of Reasons for Decision, and Order, as required 
by Utah Code Ann. section 63-46b-12. 
ADDENDUM A 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
EG&G As Co-Permittee 
1. When the Executive Secretary of the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board 
(Executive Secretary) approved a hazardous waste facility operation plan (plan or permit) for the 
Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (TOCDF) in 1989, he issued the permit to the Tooele 
Army Depot as owner and operator. Since the Army had ultimate responsibility for ownership 
and operation of the facility, the Executive Secretary properly determined that EG&G need not 
be included in the permit as a co-permittee. 
2. The Executive Secretary, at his discretion, approved a permit modification on or 
about June 18, 1996, adding EG&G, a contractor working for the Army at TOCDF, as co-
permittee. 
Falsification of Temperature Reading 
3. On or about January 9, 1997, an employee of TRC Environmental Corporation, a 
subcontractor to EG&G, intentionally recorded false information in connection with a 
temperature reading during a trial bum. The incident was investigated after being discovered by 
a state inspector and EG&G representatives, and the trial bum data for that incident were 
discarded and not used. EG&G ordered its subcontractor to permanently remove the employee 
from TOCDF. TRC agreed and did so. 
Approval of Trial Bum Plans and TOCDF Operations 
4. On June 18, 1996 and June 26, 1996, respectively, the Executive Secretary approved 
the Deactivation Furnace and Liquid Incinerator Agent Trial Bum Plans. Prior to approval of the 
trial bum plans, the Executive Secretary required the successful completion of surrogate trial 
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bums in both the Deactivation Furnace System (DFS) and the Liquid Incinerator (LIC). The 
plans for these surrogate trial bums were published for a public comment period with public 
meetings scheduled during the comment period. After considering the public comments, the 
Executive Secretary approved the surrogate trial bum plans. The Board finds and concludes that 
the Executive Secretary properly approved the trial bums and TOCDF agent operations for the 
TOCDF facility. 
5. In their Second Request for Agency Action, Petitioners alleged four bases for setting 
aside the Executive Secretary's approval of the trial bum plans. These allegations were that the 
TOCDF: (1) poses an imminent threat to human health and the environment; (2) that it could not 
prevent or minimize releases; (3) that it could not achieve the required Destruction and Removal 
Efficiency (DRE); and (4) that it did not meet emergency preparedness requirements. 
6. Before becoming fully operational, TOCDF has scheduled four trial bums for the 
DFS: (1) a "shakedown burn" with no agent; (2) an "R&D bum" with no agent; (3) a 
"shakedown bum" with agent; and (4) a "demonstration bum" with agent. TOCDF completed 
the first two bums in the DFS prior to August 22. 1996. The successful completion of these 
bums formed a strong basis to believe that TOCDF would complete the agent trial bums 
successfully. 
7. Before agent operations, pursuant to a permit (the "R&D Permit") issued by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the federal Toxic Substances Control Act 
(TSCA), TOCDF conducted a trial bum which was intended to test, and ultimately did show, that 
the DFS was capable of incinerating PCBs to the regulatory 99.9999% ("six nines") level. 
8. TOCDF also completed surrogate trial bums (STB) in the Liquid Incinerator #1 
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("LIC-1") and the DFS, and a TSCA research and development test burn in the DFS. The LIC-1 
STB was conducted in June-July, 1995, and the DFS STB was conducted in October, 1995. The 
destruction removal efficiency achieved for each test was in excess of the six-nines required. 
The results of the tests were summarized in reports submitted to the Executive Secretary and the 
Utah Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste (DSHW). 
9. The Executive Secretary issued the required approvals to initiate agent shakedown 
operations in preparation for trial burns with GB-filled M55 rockets. This approval included, but 
was not limited to, finalization of the screening risk assessment and approval of the LIC and the 
DFS agent trial burn plans. A letter summarizing approval to start agent shakedown operations 
was signed by the Executive Secretary on June 26, 1996. 
10. The Board finds that the facility does not pose an imminent threat to human health 
and the environment, that TOCDF can prevent or minimize releases, that the facility can achieve 
the required DRE, and that it meets emergency preparedness requirements. With proper 
responses to incidents or concerns, appropriate reviews and changes in or temporary suspensions 
of operations, the Army and EG&G have operated the facility in such a way as to minimize the 
release of hazardous waste and to avoid imminent hazards and mitigate any impacts to public 
health. 
Screening Health Risk Assessment 
11. Prior to approving trial burns of chemical agent at TOCDF, DEQ through its 
contractor, AT. Kearney, performed a Screening Health Risk Assessment (SRA) which analyzed 
the impacts of the expected TOCDF emissions on human health and the environment. The SRA 
followed applicable EPA guidance. 
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12. In keeping with the EPA guidance and current risk assessment practice, the SRA 
used conservative assumptions to determine the resulting risk estimates, including for example: 
(1) DEQ used maximum JACADS emissions levels, which it increased to account for the greater 
capacity of TOCDF, to model TOCDF air emissions; (2) DEQ assumed that emissions at 
TOCDF would be twice the JACADS detection limits in the cases where compounds were not 
detected; and (3) DEQ calculated the risks from exposure for up to thirty years of TOCDF 
emissions, when in fact, the facility is planned to operate for only about seven years. 
13. The SRA examined the potential exposures to a hypothetical adult and child residing 
at the point of maximum off-site emissions, three different farmers modeled upon site-specific 
data and a subsistence fisherman. Each of these individuals was modeled to live north of 
TOCDF, which is downwind of the facility for 350 days of the year. For each of these six 
individuals, assuming simultaneous and continuous operation of all five furnaces and other 
TOCDF and CAMDS facilities for thirty years, the overall cancer and non-cancer risks were at or 
below EPA risk levels. 
14. With respect to cancer effects of dioxin, the risk assessment used EPA's current 
conservative methodology to calculate overall cancer risks from TOCDF emissions and found 
that the overall cancer risks do not exceed EPA guidance levels for ten, fifteen and thirty-year 
operating periods. The SRA did not include a calculation of non-cancer effects of dioxin 
exposure because EPA had not adopted a reference dose for dioxin. Respondent's expert, Dr. 
Finley, calculated average daily intakes of dioxin for the six risk assessment scenarios used by 
DEQ in the SRA, and testified that these exposures should be below the level of concern for non-
cancer effects. 
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15. Dr. Finley also calculated the cancer and non-cancer risks for a likely one-year trial 
burn period and determined that conservatively estimated risks were orders of magnitude below 
EPA target levels. He also declared that the conservatively estimated doses of dioxin to a breast 
fed infant were below the level "of concern. 
16. Respondents' medical expert, Dr. Guzelian, testified that low level environmental 
exposures to dioxin are unlikely to produce adverse human health consequences. EPA's Science 
Advisory Board also has reported that the scientific evidence compiled by EPA does not support 
a conclusion that adverse effects in humans may be occurring near the current exposure levels. 
There is insufficient evidence to conclude that low level exposures to dioxin that may be caused 
by operation of the facility will cause, or are likely to cause, adverse human health effects. 
Quantitative Risk Assessment 
17. Using an independent contractor, the Army arranged for preparation of both a 
quantitative risk assessment for the first two disposal campaigns and a comprehensive 
quantitative risk assessment for all TOCDF operations, performed using information specific to 
TOCDF, as recommended by the National Research Council. These assessments quantified the 
actual probability of occurrence for events leading to an accidental release of chemical agent and 
evaluated the potential consequences of such releases in terms of fatalities. The analysis, 
completed in December, 1996, confirmed the Army's earlier determination that the risks of 
fatalities associated with storage greatly exceed those associated with TOCDF operations. The 
total risks of accidental fatalities for an assumed 7.1 year period of TOCDF operations are 
equivalent to the risks associated with only thirty-four days of continued storage. With respect to 
individuals living closest to TOCDF, the risks resulting from continued storage are one hundred 
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times greater than the risks resulting from disposal operations. 
Revocation/Termination of Plan Approval: Non-Compliance Issues 
18. Petitioners have challenged the Executive Secretary's issuance of the plan approval 
and certain modifications thereto on grounds of the permittees' non-compliance with the law and 
the permit, and with an allegation that the Executive Secretary's actions were unsupported by 
substantial evidence or were arbitrary and capricious. Petitioners did not present evidence that 
either the Army or EG&G has had a poor compliance history on safety and environmental issues 
or has failed to comply with legal or permit requirements in connection with TOCDF. The 
Board finds no evidence sufficient to justify revocation or termination of the Army and EG&G's 
permit on these grounds. 
Revocation/Termination of Plan Approval: Operational Incidents 
19. Petitioners allege that the permit should be revoked or otherwise terminated because 
of certain incidents described in the evidence presented to the Board, namely: agent migration 
into filter vestibules, cracks in a concrete floor, agent migration into an observation corridor, 
facility response to a loss of site electrical power, fire suppression system test and temporary 
HVAC imbalance, agent quantification anomaly, improper hot cut-outs and the question of agent 
emissions in the TOCDF stack effluent gases. The Board finds no evidence sufficient to justify 
revocation or termination of the Army and EG&G's permit on these grounds. 
20. Operations at TOCDF during the shakedown period have proceeded deliberately to 
ensure that full-scale operations will be conducted in a manner that maximizes the protection of 
TOCDF workers, the public and the environment. DSHW has engaged in extensive oversight of 
TOCDF operations. DSHW has an office on the facility, has conducted oversight on almost a 
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daily basis, and has a real-time computer link which transmits data to a computer terminal at 
DSHW's offices in Salt Lake City. 
21. During the shakedown period, three events occurred that caused Respondents to 
immediately shut down operations: detection of low levels of agent in two filter unit containment 
vestibules, leakage of a small quantity of decontamination fluid passing through hairline cracks 
in a second level cement floor to a first floor electrical room, and minor agent migration into an 
observation corridor. Two of the incidents involved trace amounts of chemical agent migrating 
to unintended areas. None resulted in harm to TOCDF personnel, the public or the environment. 
Descriptions of the events and corrective actions taken in response to each event have been 
adequately explained to the Board and the Executive Secretary, and were adequately addressed 
by the Army and EG&G. 
22. With regard to the other incidents described in paragraph 19 above, the Board finds 
that: adequate backup generators are in place at TOCDF, and there has never been an occasion 
when the backup power system failed to operate upon loss of power; the fire suppression system 
test and temporal*)' HVAC imbalance was properly responded to and TOCDF personnel have 
received corrective training; the agent quantification system anomaly has been corrected; hot cut 
out procedures are a normal part of facility operations, and appropriate workers are equipped 
with protective equipment; and stack effluent gases are appropriately monitored by ACAMS and 
DAAMS systems and the agent readings in the ACAMS TREND reports were challenges to the 
monitoring equipment and not releases of agent. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND REASONS FOR DECISION 
1. In approving the permit in 1989, the Executive Secretary acted in accordance with 
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applicable rules and statutes, and acted in a manner that was appropriate and timely. The Board 
recognizes that it is not unusual for a hazardous waste facility to have subcontractors or 
contractors participating in operating the facility. The existence of such contractors does not 
necessarily mean that they are "operators" of the facility within the meaning of the Utah Solid 
and Hazardous Waste Act and rules issued thereunder. As the Army had ultimate responsibility 
for ownership and operation of the facility, the Executive Secretary properly determined that 
EG&G, a contractor for the Army, need not be included in the permit as a co-permittee. 
2. While not legally required to add the Army's contractor, EG&G, as co-permittee, the 
Executive Secretary acted within his discretion and in accordance with applicable rules and 
statutes, including RCRA section 3005, 42 U.S.C. section 6925, and the Utah Solid and 
Hazardous Waste Act, Utah Code Ann section 19-6-108, and acted in a manner that was 
appropriate and timely, in approving the permit modification adding EG&G as co-permittee in 
1996. The Executive Secretary acted properly and well within his discretion regarding the 
timing and processing of the TOCDF permit given the generalized nature of the applicable 
statutory and regulatory requirements. At no time was TOCDF constructed or operated without 
the required permit(s). 
3. The January 9, 1997 recording of false information regarding a temperature reading by 
an employee of TRC during a trial burn was discovered by EG&G and DSHW personnel on that 
same day. The temperature readings did not affect the burn itself, but related to the temperature 
needed to preserve a sample. EG&G quality assurance staff immediately recorded the incident 
and commenced preparation of a deficiency report. At that time, EG&G ordered its 
subcontractor to permanently remove the employee from TOCDF. TRC agreed and did so. TRC 
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also indicated that the employee acted alone and took full responsibility for its employee's 
misconduct. TRC agreed to pay for the repeat of the trial burn run, given that the results of the 
January 9 run were discarded. In addition, as further corrective action to avoid any repeat of the 
incident, TRC conducted extensive ethics training for its employees working at TOCDF. 
EG&G's Risk Management Department Director, Tom Kurkjy, testified that the problem has not 
reoccurred. 
4. The Petitioners have failed to provide data or present evidence indicating that the 
Executive Secretary's approval of trial burns was inappropriate or not in accordance with law. 
The Board recognizes the importance of trial burn data relative to understanding any emissions at 
TOCDF and for purposes of approval of full-scale activity at TOCDF once the trial burns are 
completed. The Board finds and concludes that the Executive Secretary and DSHW acted 
properly in approving the trial burns and in the collection of data during the trial burns. 
5. Rule R315-3-20 of the Utah Administrative Code establishes the standard to issue a 
hazardous waste incinerator plan approval (permit). Under the provisions of R315-3-20(b)(5), 
the Executive Secretary shall approve a plan if: (1) the trial burn is likely to determine whether 
the incinerator performance standard can be met; (2) the trial burn itself will not present an 
imminent hazard to human health or the environment; (3) the trial burn will help the Executive 
Secretary determine operating requirements; and the information sought in items (1) and (2) 
cannot reasonably be developed through other means. In their Second Request for Agency 
Action, Petitioners alleged four bases (listed in paragraph 5 above) for setting aside the approval 
of the trial burn plans. The Board concludes that Petitioners have failed to present evidence on 
these issues sufficient to justify revocation, termination or modification of the plans by the 
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Board. 
6. The Board finds and concludes that the Screening Risk Assessment (SRA) was 
performed using applicable EPA guidance and met all requirements for a health risk assessment. 
The SRA indicates that TOCDF can be operated as designed within the risks established by EPA 
for emissions as set forth in the design and construction. With respect to open burning / open 
detonation (OB/OD) activities, the Executive Secretary has prohibited the Army from conducting 
OB/OD until such time as a combined health risk assessment for both TOCDF operations and 
OB/OD is completed and indicates that the combined health risk is within acceptable limits. 
7. The Petitioners failed to present evidence refuting the conclusions of the SRA, and 
the Board finds and concludes that the Executive Secretary acted appropriately in approving 
operations based on information in the SRA. The SRA was not a required study but was done at 
the discretion of the Executive Secretary and the Army because of their concern for human health 
and the environment, and the SRA will continue to be revised in the future as appropriate, for 
example, in the event of OB/OD activities simultaneous with TOCDF incineration operations. 
The risks of continued storage outweigh the risks from TOCDF operations, as outlined in the 
QRA. 
8. The Board concludes that the preponderance of the evidence supports the Executive 
Secretary's approval of TOCDF's trial burn plans, permit and permit modifications, and denies 
Petitioners' First and Second Requests for Agency Action. 
9. In further support of its decision, the Board hereby incorporates into these 
Conclusions of Law and Reasons for Decision all of the Findings of Fact set forth above, and 
also incorporates by reference the transcript of the Board members' comments and deliberations 
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on this matter on April 17, 1997 (Transcript of Hearing, Volume No. 4). 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that the relief requested in Petitioners' First and Second Requests for Agency Action 
is hereby denied, and that the TOCDF permits and permit modifications approved by the 
Executive Secretary are upheld and shall remain in effect unless amended, revoked or otherwise 
affected by the Executive Secretary or by further order of the Board. 
DATED this day of July, 1997. 
UTAH SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE 
CONTROL BOARD 
By: Richard B. White, Board Chairman 
NOTICE 
Under Utah Coae Ann. section 63-46b-I3, any party may request that this Order 
be reconsidered by the Board. Any such request must be in writing, must be filed with the Board 
(with a copy to each party) within twenty days after the date shown on the attached mailing 
certificate, and must state specific grounds upon which relief is requested. 
Judicial review of this Order may be sought in the Utah Court of Appeals under 
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applicable statutes and court rules, including Utah Code Ann. sections 63-46b-14 and -16 and 
78-2a-3 and Rule 14, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, by the filing of a proper petition within 
thirty days of the date shown on the attached mailing certificate for this Order (or, if applicable, 
within thirty days after a request for reconsideration is denied). 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the <^<2. day of July, 1997 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER was mailed first-class, postage prepaid to: 
Mick Harrison 
GreenLaw, Suite 7 
200 Short Street 
P.O. Box 467 
Berea, KY 40403 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Randy Skanchy 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
170 So. Main Street, Ste 1500 
Salt Lake City. UT 84101-1644 
Robert Ukeiley 
Ecological Consult, for the Public Interest 
1942 Broadway, Ste 206 
Boulder, CO 80302 
Richard E. Condit 
Greenlaw, Inc. 
1347 Emerald Street 
P.O. Box 1078 
Washington, D. C. 20013-1978 
Craig D. Galli 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main Street, Ste 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
Alan D. Greenberg 
Robert H. Foster 
Environmental Defense Section 
U.S. Dept. Of Justice 
999 18th Street, Ste 945 (North Tower) 
Denver, CO 80202 
Captain Michael E. Mulligan 
Gerald P. Kohns 
Department of the Army 
U. S. Army Litigation Center 
901 North Stuart St. Ste 400 
Arlington, VA 22203-1837 
13 
Richard B. White, Chairman 
Solid & Hazardous Waste Control Bd. 
EarthFax Engineering, Inc. 
7324 S. Union Park Avenue, Ste 100 
Midvale, UT 84047 
Laura J. Lockhart 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140873 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0873 
Dennis Downs. Executive Secretary 
Utah Solid & Hazard. Waste Board 
288 No. 1460 West 
P. O. Box 144880 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-4880 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE-DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
CHEMICAL WEAPONS WORKING 
GROUP, INC., SIERRA CLUB, and 
VIETNAM VETERANS OF AMERICA 
FOUNDATION. 
Plaintiffs. 
vs. 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE 
ARMY. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 
OF DEFENSE, and EG&G DEFENSE 
MATERIALS. INC.. 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 2:96-CV-0425C 
This matter is before the court on defendant EG&G*s motion to dismiss Count 10. 
Because the defendant has submitted matters in support of its motion that are outside the 
pleadings, the court shall treat this motion as one for summary judgment. F.R.C.P. 12(c). Having 
determined that oral argument would not materially assist in the resolution of this matter, 
DUCivR7-l(f), the court now enters the following order based upon the submissions of the 
parties and applicable legal authority: 
ADDENDUM B 
Background 
On or about June 18, 1996, the Utah Division of Solid & Hazardous Waste (the 
"Division") added EG&G as a co-permittee to the Department of the Army's license to operate 
the Tooele Chemical Demilitarization Facility ("TOCDF"). 
On July 18, 1996, the plaintiffs in this action petitioned the Utah Solid and Hazardous 
Waste Control Board (the "Board") to reverse the Division's action. Plaintiffs alleged, among 
other things, that EG&G had violated 42 U.S.C. § 6925 and Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-108(3)(a) by 
operating TOCDF from 1989 to 1996 without the necessary permits. In light of this long history 
of alleged noncompliance, plaintiffs argued that it was arbitran- and capricious for the Division to 
approve EG&G as a co-permittee in 1996. 
Between March 18 and April 17 of this year, the Board heard approximately 22 hours of 
testimony and argument on this matter. At these hearings, plaintiffs had an opportunity to 
examine personnel from the Division who were responsible for the decision to add EG&G as a 
co-permittee on the Army's license. 
Following the hearing, plaintiffs submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. These proposed findings supported plaintiffs' contention that the Division had acted 
capriciously when it "add[ed] EG&G to the TOCDF permit as an operator late in the game, after 
EG&G had operated TOCDF without a permit for a substantial period of time." Plaintiffs also 
requested that "the Board . . . suspend approvals for agent operations until the Army can make 
changes in . . . [its] operator . . . . " (Petitioners" Post-Hearing Brief and Proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law at 1-2.) 
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On July 22, 1997, the Board issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The first 
finding of fact by the Board reads in relevant part as follows: 
1. When the Executive Secretary . . . approved a hazardous waste facility 
operation plan . . . for the [TOCDF] in 1989, he issued the permit to the Tooele 
Army Depot as owner and operator. Since the army had ultimate responsibility for 
ownership and operation of the facility, the Executive Secretary properly 
determined that EG&G need not be included in the permit as a co-permittee. 
The first conclusion of law reads in relevant part as follows: 
1. In approving the permit in 1989, the Executive Secretary acted in 
accordance with applicable rules and statutes, and acted in a manner that was 
appropriate and timely. The Board recognizes that it is not unusual for a 
hazardous waste facility to have subcontractors or contractors participating in 
operating the facility. The existence of such contractors does not necessarily mean 
they are "operators" of the facility within the meaning of the Utah Solid and 
Hazardous Waste Act and rules issued thereunder. As the Army had ultimate 
responsibility for ownership and operation of the facility, the Executive Secretary' 
properly determined that EG&G, a contractor for the Army, need not be included 
in the permit as co-permittee. 
(Board Order at 2, 9). Based upon these findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Board 
determined that the Division's decision to add EG&G as a co-permittee on the Army's license in 
1996 was neither arbitrary or capricious. 
Discussion 
The defendant, EG&G, seeks summary judgment on the ground that the legal and factual 
issues raised by the plaintiffs in Count 10 have already been decided by State of Utah Solid and 
Hazardous Waste Control Board ("Board"). According to EG&G, under the principles of 
collateral estoppel, the Board's decision bars litigation of Count 10 in this court. This court must 
give preclusive effect to the Board's decision if it would be accorded such effect by the courts of 
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Utah, the state of its origin. Saavedra v. City of Albequerque. 73 F.3d 1525, 1534-35 (10th Cir. 
1996). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the following elements must be satisfied before a 
party may be collaterally estopped from relitigating issues already decided in another forum: 
(1) The issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one 
presented in the action in question; (2) there must be a final judgment on the 
merits, (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted must be a party in privity 
with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the issue in the first action must be 
completely, fully, and fairly litigated. 
Career Serv. Review Bd. v. Department of Corrections. 322 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 10 (Sup.Ct., July 
22, 1997) (citing Searle Bros v. Searle. 588 P.2d 689. 691 (Utah 1978)). If those elements are 
satisfied, however, the Utah courts will give preclusive effect to court judgments and agency 
decisions alike. Id. 
I. Identity of Issues. 
On July 18, 1996, plaintiffs petitioned the Board to revoke EG&G's permit to operate 
TOCDF. As grounds therefore, plaintiffs stated that EG&G had violated the requirement of Utah 
Code Ann. § 19-6-108(3 )(a) by operating TOCDF without the necessary Division permit from 
1989 to 1996. 
Count 10 of the plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint in the present case simply renews 
plaintiffs' claim before the Board. Count 10 alleges that EG&G violated Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-
108(3)(a) by operating TOCDF from 1989 to 1996 without a permit from the Division. (Second 
Amended Complaint at 53-54.) 
Despite the obvious similarity of the claims presented to the Board and to this court, 
4 
plaintiffs insist that the issues are merely "related," but not identical. First, plaintiffs assert that 
the question before the Board was whether the Division acted capriciously in adding EG&G to 
the license as a co-permittee in 1996. Plaintiffs ignore, however, that the Division's decision to 
add EG&G as a co-permittee would have been capricious only if EG&G had operated TOCDF 
without the required permit from 1989 to 1996. In resolving plaintiffs' capriciousness claims, 
therefore, the Board necessarily determined that EG&G was not required to obtain a permit 
during the 1989-96 period. 
Second, plaintiffs argue that even if the Board considered the same state claims that are 
advanced here. Count 10 also seeks redress for alleged violations of the federal statute, a matter 
over which the state Board had no iumAction. 42 U.S.C. § 6925. With respect to these federal 
law violations, plaintiffs argue that the\ cannot be collaterally estopped by the state proceedings. 
Plaintiffs are correct that exclusive jurisdiction over suits alleging violations of the federal 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act is lodged in the federal district courts. 42 U.S.C. § 
6972(a). It is equally true, however, that once the Environmental Protection Agency authorized 
the State of Utah to administer and enforce a hazardous waste program in lieu of the federal 
program. 49 Fed.Reg. 39693 (Oct. 10. 1984). the federal statute was no longer applicable. See. 
e.g.. Murray v. Bath Iron Works Corp.. 867 F.Supp. 33, 42 (D.Me. 1994) ("a direct action under 
section 6972(a)(1)(A) is unavailable where the applicable federal requirements of RCRA have 
been superseded by an EPA-authorized state hazardous waste program pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
6926(bD; Dague v. City of Burlington. 732 F.Supp. 458, 465 (D.Vt. 1989) ("a plaintiff seeking 
to challenge the operation of a hazardous waste site in an EPA authorized state may bring an 
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action under state law, not federal law . . ."). Thus, the Board considered the only claims which 
plaintiffs may actually advance, i.e., those based on state law. 
The court therefore finds that the issues presented by Count 10 are identical to those 
presented to the Board. 
II. Final Judgment on the Merits. 
Plaintiffs argue that so long as the Board's decision may be reversed by the Utah Court of 
Appeals, the decision is not final for purposes of collateral estoppel. The Tenth Circuit has held 
to the contrary: "Utah law provides that, unless it is reversed on appeal, a judgment is final for 
issue preclusion purposes;' Ativa v. Salt Lake Countv. 988 F.2d 1013. 1020 (10th Cir. 1993). 
The Tenth Circuit's determination is binding on this court. Therefore, despite the pendency of 
plaintiffs" appeal, the Board's decision is final for purposes of this motion. 
III. Identity of Partv Against Whom Plea is Asserted. 
Defendant asserts that the plaintiffs in this action were also the plaintiffs in the 
administrative hearing before the board. Plaintiffs do not dispute this fact. 
IV. Opportunity for Full and Fair Litigation. 
Utah case law does "not require either a motion or a hearing for full and fair litigation but 
says only that 'the parties must receive notice under all the circumstances, to apprise them of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.'" Career Serv. 
Review Bd. 322 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10 (quoting Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno. 735 P.2d 
387.391 (Utah.App. 1987). See also. Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp.. 456 U.S. 46L 481 
(1982) ("state proceedings need do no more than satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of 
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the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in order to qualify for the full-faith-and-credit 
guaranteed by federal law"). 
Plaintiffs received all the opportunity for full and fair litigation that Utah law or the federal 
constitution require. In addition to filing various pleadings, plaintiffs were allowed over twelve 
hours of time to present witnesses. Plaintiffs also conducted cross-examination or voir dire of 
several witnesses called by EG&G. Although even more time and process might have been 
desirable from plaintiffs' perspective, the process actually accorded them was sufficient for 
purposes of the collateral estoppel analysis. 
Plaintiffs also argue that they lacked the incentive to litigate fully in front of the Board 
because the Board could not impose fines or penalties under the federal statute. This contention 
is without merit. First, as explained above, no court has the power to impose penalties on EG&G 
under the federal statute: it has been superseded by the state regulatory scheme. Second, had 
plaintiffs prevailed in front of the state agency. EG&G might well have been ordered to cease its 
operations at TOCDF. It is hard to conceive, in light of plaintiffs' vigorous efforts to prevent 
operations at TOCDF (including two preliminary injunction hearings before this court), that the 
potential halt of test burns at TOCDF did not provide them with adequate incentives to litigate the 
issue. The court therefore finds that this element of the collateral estoppel test is satisfied. 
Conclusion 
Each of the elements necessary for collateral estoppel under Utah law has been satisfied. 
Plaintiffs are estopped from relitigating the issue of EG&G's licensure in this forum when that 
question was already decided against them in front of the Board. The court's resolution of this 
7 
matter makes consideration of defendant's Burford abstention argument unnecessan'. 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment on Count 10 is hereby GRANTED. 
SO ORDERED this (0 day of October, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
3^V\Cc \LCK**J£X+LM 
TENA CAMPBELL 
United States District Judge 
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